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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A. Issues
This memo analyzes whether the events which occurred in the village of Al-Dujayl
constitute a crime under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. (Part I).

Next, it will

examine the substantive legal defenses which the Defendants might raise when charges are
brought against them as a result of their alleged participation in the attacks. (Part II). Finally, it
will discuss Saddam Hussein’s culpability and possible defenses if charges are eventually
brought against him for the same crimes as brought against those who have already been charged
with crimes related to the village of Al-Dujayl. ({Part III).
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The Criminal Culpability of the Defendants
If the facts stipulated are proved, the Defendants, when brought before the Iraqi Special
Tribunal (“IST”) could be convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes in violation the
Geneva Convention. These acts do not amount to crimes of genocide because the Defendants
did not specifically attack a particular ethnic, racial or religious group.

Nevertheless, the

Defendants’ actions constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. They engaged in and
ordered the violent death of the residents of and destruction of the village of Al Dujayl. They
did so through armed conflict, using extreme force to systematically attack these civilians. These
Defendants should be held responsible for their criminal behavior in the Iraqi Special Tribunal
using applicable international laws and standards.

1

2. The Defendant’s Possible Defenses
The Defendants may claim self-defense, reprisals, justifiable necessity and obedience to
the orders of a superior as possible defenses to these allegations. While these defenses will not
exonerate the Defendants, they do have a legitimate argument for mitigation of their sentence
through the doctrine of obedience to the orders of a superior. Historically, this defense has been
successful during sentencing. The prosecution will be able to respond to this defense by making
the argument that the Defendants crimes were shocking and extensive and that they were under a
duty to disobey since they knew that their conduct was illegal. These factors will support the
prosecution’s argument for a conviction without a mitigated sentence.
3. Criminal Culpability of Saddam Hussein
If the Iraqi Special Tribunal chooses to bring charges against Saddam Hussein in connection
with the attacks against the village of Al-Dujayl, he would be held culpable for the crimes of his
subordinates through the doctrine of command responsibility. Hussein had effective control of
the actions of the Defendants, was aware of the Defendant’s plot to destroy the village of AlDujayl and did not prevent or punish their behavior.

Since, Hussein’s conduct meets the

requirements of culpability for command responsibility; the prosecution has a viable case against
him.
II.

Factual Background

Before proceeding to the legal analysis, it is necessary to discuss the factual background
relating to the Defendants’ and Saddam Hussein’s interaction with the people of the village of
Al-Dujayl. In July of 1982, Hussein's motorcade was traveling through the village of Al-Dujayl,
a town located approximately 40 miles north of Baghdad. 1 One of the villagers marked a

1

Times Staff and Wire Reports, Conflict in Iraq: Iraqi Judge on Tribunal Assassinated in Baghdad, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, March 2, 2005. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 46}.

2

vehicle in the convoy with a red marking, signaling to other villagers to fire upon the vehicle in
what was an apparent plot to kill Hussein. 2 The attackers shot at the decoy vehicle, unaware that
Hussein had escaped into another vehicle before the gunfight ensued and instead killed several
members of Hussein’s entourage. 3
Within hours Iraqi intelligence agents and police appeared in the village. 4 One hundred
and forty three residents were immediately rounded up and executed later following show trials. 5
Fifteen hundred villagers were imprisoned and detained for years without ever being formally
charged.

6

The remaining residents of the town were deported to Iran. 7 In addition, government

forces destroyed the town's date palm and fruit orchards and numerous homes in retaliation for
the attack on the convoy. 8 Bulldozers were eventually sent to destroy the entire village. 9
The Defendants who are alleged to have carried out all of these attacks against the
villagers of Al-Dujayl are Barzan Ibrahim Hassan Tikriti, Hussein's half-brother and the former
chief of Iraqi intelligence; Taha Yassin Ramadan, a former deputy prime minister and vice
president; Awad Hamad Bandr Sadun, former chief judge of the Revolutionary Court; Abdullah
2

Hannah Allam, Ex-Iraqi Officials Face Criminal Trial, THE TIMES UNION, March 1, 2005. {Reproduced in the
accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 47}.
3

Jackie Spinner, U.S. Forces Detain Father, Son in ’82 Massacre: Hundreds Were Killed in Shiite Muslim Village,
THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 27, 2005.{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 48}.

4

Monte Morin, The Conflict in Iraq: Ex-Hussein Aides to Be Tried for Alleged Crimes Against Humanity, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Los Angeles Times, March 1, 2005. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 49}.
5

Global News Wire Staff, Iraq Refers First Case Involving Saddam Officials for Trial, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE,
March 1 2005. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 50}.

6

Edward Wong, Five of Saddam’s Allies are Charged with Crimes Against Humanity, THE INERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, March 2, 2005. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 51}.

7

Issue Statement From the Iraqi Special Tribunal{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 74}

8

United Press International Staff, Killing Make Iraq Judges More Fearful, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL,
March 2, 2005. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 52}.
9

Economist Staff, Iraq: The Town that Disappeared, THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER, 1982, Dec. 4, 1982.
{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 53}.

3

Kadam Roweed Musheikhi, a local Baath Party official; and his son, Mizher Abdullah Kadam
Roweed Musheikhi. 10 Tikriti is alleged to be responsible for leading the entire attack onto the
village. 11 Ramadan is said to have led the effort to eliminate the livelihoods of the towns
remaining residents by systematically destroying the date plantations and farms which the
residents relied upon. 12 Al-Sudan is accused of conducting the secret trials that led to the
execution of the one-hundred and forty three men. 13 Al-Musheikhi and his son, Mizher are
accused with assisting secret agencies arrest the fifteen hundred detained villagers. 14

If

convicted, each of these individuals faces the death penalty. 15
The Iraqi Special Tribunal released the following statement regarding these incidents:
“The Hussein government knew that the assassination attempt was a ‘crime of opportunity’ with
few participants but retaliated against the entire village.”
essentially disappeared as a result of these events.17

16

The village of Al-Dujayl has

The village originally contained a

significant Sunni and Shia Muslim population. 18
III.

Jurisdiction of the Iraqi Special Tribunal

10

Edward Wong, Charges Presented Against Five Former Allies of Saddam Hussein, NEW YORK TIMES, March
1, 2005. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 54}.
11

Liz Sly, Iraqi Tribunal Charges Saddam Regime Members with Human-Rights Abuses, THE CHIGAGO
TRIBUNE, March 1, 2005. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab55}.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Morin, supra note 4. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 49}.

16

Caryle Murphy, Special Iraqi Court to Try Ex-Officials: Case Centers on Mass Executions After 1982 Attempt to
Kill Hussein, THE WASHINGTON POST, March 1, 2005. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab
56}.

17

Economist Staff, supra note 9. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 53}.

18

Id.

4

B. Jurisdictional Statement
The Iraqi Special Tribunal has jurisdiction over any Iraqi national or resident of
Iraq with respect to acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes of humanity committed in
Iraq between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003. This extends to crimes committed against
the people of Iraq (including its Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Assyrians and other ethnic groups,
and its Shi’ites and Sunnis) whether or not committed in armed conflict.

19

C. The Applicable Articles of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Article 11 of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute focuses on crimes of genocide, which are
defined as acts of killing, causing serious bodily harm, inflicting conditions of life to bring about
destruction, preventing birth or transferring children on a specific national, ethnical, racial or
religious group. 20 Article 13 defines war crimes as a breach of the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949 against persons protected by the Geneva Convention. The acts delineated in
this article include willful killing, torture, causing great suffering, destruction of property,
unlawful deportations committed in an armed conflict.

21

Article 12 focuses on crimes against

humanity which are defined as acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, and rape which are part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population. 22
Jurisdiction to Hear the Defendant’s and Saddam Hussein’s Case

19

Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 1(b), Dec. 10, 2003 available at http://www.cpairaq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm (last visited April, 18, 2005) [hereinafter IST Statute]. {Reproduced in the
accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 1}.
20
21
22

Id. at art. 11.
Id. at art. 13.
Id. at art. 12.

5

The Iraqi Special Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the case against the Defendants for the
alleged acts that they committed against the people of Al Dujayl. The Defendants are residents
of Iraq and committed these acts against residents of Iraq. They have allegedly committed
crimes against humanity and war crimes in violation of the Geneva Convention against the
people of Al Dujayl, in violation of Articles 12 and 13 of the Statute of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal.

The Iraqi Special Tribunal therefore has jurisdiction against the alleged crimes

committed by the Defendants. The Iraqi Special Tribunal also has jurisdiction over Saddam
Hussein if it chooses to indict him in connection with these alleged criminal activities since he is
also a resident of Iraq.
PART ONE
IV. CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF THE DEFENDANTS
A. Genocide
The term “Genocide” derives from the Greek term “genos”, meaning “race, nation, or
tribe,” and from the Latin term “caedere”, or “cide” meaning "to kill."

23

In 1944, Raphael

Lemkin, a Polish Jewish lawyer, first developed this term which is now widely used.

24

After

developing this term, Lemkin strived to encourage a broader recognition of the crime of
eliminating entire ethnic, cultural, and racial groups through his genocide proposals.

25

Genocide is now considered to be an atrocious crime. This crime has manifested repeatedly in
modern times throughout the world. This crime demonstrates a human capacity for cruelty on an

23

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA (8th ed. 2005). {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 60}.

24

Thomas Simon, Defining Genocide, 5 WIS. INT'L L.J. 243 (1996). {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook
3 at Tab 38}.
25

Veena Iyer, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 295 (2003).
{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 39}.
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unprecedented and horrifying scale for which the international community rigidly condemns. 26
A charge of genocide requires proof of specific elements which can be a difficult task for the
prosecution.
The Defendants cannot be prosecuted in the Iraqi Special Tribunal for genocide relating
to the events that occurred in the village of Al Dujayl in July of 1982. A crime of genocide
requires that the acts be committed against a specific national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 27
The criminal acts against the people of Al Dujayl were not the result of any such classification.
The people of Al Dujayl are not a protected group of people that were targeted by the
Defendants. The people of Al Dujayl are simply residents of Iraq. While the majority of the
village is of Muslim origin, they are a mix of Sunni and Shi’ite Muslim and cannot be considered
as a cohesive group. 28
Article II of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as the following:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a) killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 29

26

Payam Akhavan, Recent Development: Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization,
8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229 (1995). {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 40}.
27

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, available at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 10}.
28

Economist Staff, supra note 9. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 53}

29

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 27. {Reproduced in the
accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 10}.

7

The language of this treaty highlights three important elements. First, the victims must
constitute a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Second, the Convention dictates that
certain enumerated acts of harm or willful neglect must have been inflicted upon members of the
group. Third, those acts of harm must have been undertaken with the intent to destroy or
partially destroy the group. Each of these three elements must be present to constitute a crime of
genocide. 30
The first required element of the crime of genocide requires a group status of the victims.
These victims must belong to a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. This evaluation is
subjective since these terms are not defined by either the Genocide Convention or international
humanitarian law. 31 In the case at hand, the prosecution can possibly make a showing that the
Defendants did inflict willful harm upon the people of the village of Al-Dujayl with the intent to
destroy the group and village, satisfying the second and third required elements. The first
element, requiring a group status of the victims would, however, prove difficult for the
prosecution to establish.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) have attempted to define the groups that qualify
for protection under Article II of the Crime of Genocide. The ICTR, in The Case of the
Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Jean Paul Akayesu stated that identity of the groups that
qualified for protected status for the crime of genocide must be based on “hereditary physical
traits often identified within a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or

30

Genocide in Darbur: A Legal Analysis, Sept. 28, 2004, available at http://www.law.case.edu/war-crimes-researchportal/instant_analysis.asp?id=10 {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 61},
31

Id.

8

religious factors.” 32 The Tribunal also stated that a described ethnic group could also be “one
whose members share a common language and culture.” 33

The Tribunal found Jean Paul

Akayesu guilty of genocide for his actions committed in Rwanda in 1994 after finding that the
Tutsi group is a protected group of ethnic and racial similarities. 34
It would be difficult for the prosecutors of the Iraqi Special Tribunal to qualify the villagers
of Al-Dujayl as a protected class because they are not consolidated in the same religious or
ethnic group. The village, while being predominantly a “Shiite Muslim village”
with a “Sunni and Shia Muslim population”. 36

35

is also mixed

The villagers do not meet the precedent set by

the Akayesu case because they do not share any hereditary physical traits or a common culture or
language. The diversity of the villagers will serve as a bar for protection under the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
While the village is not of a uniform religious or cultural composition, the prosecution could
possibly make the argument that the villagers were all national Iraqis, giving them a protected
group status. Hurst Hannum, Professor of International Law at The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy of Tufts University and world-renowned consultant to the United Nations on issues
ranging from minority rights to the situations in Afghanistan, East Timor, and Western Sahara
has argued that the killing of victims who are members of a national group does constitute

32

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998) {Reproduced in the
accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 20}.

33

Id at para 513.

34

Id. at Sec. 8.

35

Morin, supra note 4. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 49}.

36

Economist Staff, supra note 9. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 53}
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genocide.

37

Hannum defended this argument specifically in the case of the treatment of

Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge during the years of 1975-1979. 38 The Khmer Rouge subjected
various groups of people in Cambodia to an especially harsh and extensive measures of the acts
enumerated in Article II of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

39

While these atrocities were committed against diverse

ethnic groups such as Cham, Vietnamese, Buddhist monks and other minority groups who are
protected groups, commentators including Hannum have asserted that the Khmer Rouge
committed genocide against the Khmer national group, intending to destroy a part of it. 40
The argument that a national group deserves protected status under Article II of the 1948
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has
been widely criticized. The argument generally fails because it leads to the conclusion that all
mass killings are equivalent to genocide. If that were the case, then any large group of people
will belong to one or more national groups and will be able to claim protection. 41 This circular
argument deprives the crime of genocide of its distinct meaning and is therefore an unfavorable
argument.

37

Bio of Hurst Hannum, International Center for Alcohol Policies, available at
http://www.icap.org/ICAP/about_ICAP/ICAP_Senior_Consultants/hannum.html{Reproduced in the accompanying
Notebook 3 at Tab 73}.
38

Hurst Hannum, International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence, 11 HUM RTS. QRT. 82, 9596, 135-38 (1989). {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 41}.
39

Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia, U.N. Doc. S/1999/231 (March 16, 1999). {Reproduced in the
accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab}.
40

Id.

41

William A. Schabas, Problems of International Codification – Were the Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo
Genocide?, Pgs. available at www.nesl.edu/lawrev/vol35/2/schabas.pdf {Reproduced in the accompanying
Notebook 3 at Tab 62}.
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Even if the prosecution were able to establish that the villagers are part of a protected class,
this genocide argument will nevertheless, fail since the Defense will then state that it was not the
Defendant’s intent to destroy this specific Iraqi national group. They will assert that they were
retaliating against the village as a whole due to the assassination attempt against Saddam
Hussein. They will argue that the attacks had no bearing on the group status of the village.
Intent to destroy a group based on ethnic or racial status is an element of the crime of genocide
and in this case, the defense will state that the requisite intent was not present. So, even if the
village could obtain protected status to satisfy the first element, while the second element of
willful destruction is satisfied, the allegation of genocide would eventually fail because the intent
to kill the group of villagers on the basis of group status is not present.
It is interesting to note that the ICTY has in one instance, taken a substantially different
analysis in evaluating crimes of genocide. In the ICTY case, The Prosecutor Against Goran
Jellisic, the Tribunal stated that the objective criteria alone were insufficient and believed that it
was appropriate to evaluate a group status from the view of those persons who wish to single that
group out from the rest of the community. 42 It is the stigmatization of a group as a distinct
national, ethnical or racial unit by the community which allows it to be determined whether a
targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group in the eyes of the alleged
perpetrators. 43 A group may be stigmatized in this manner by way of positive or negative
criteria. A "positive approach" would consist of the perpetrators of the crime distinguishing a
group by the characteristics which they deem to be particular to a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group. A "negative approach" would consist of identifying individuals as not being
42

Prosecutor v. Goran Jellisic, Case No.: IT-95-10-A, Judgment, Dec. 14, 1999, at 70.{Reproduced in the
accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 21}

43

Id at 71.
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part of the group to which the perpetrators of the crime consider that they themselves belong and
which to them displays specific national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.

44

The

Tribunal therefore, concluded that then all rejected individuals would be able to create a distinct
group. 45
In May 1992, Goran Jellisic, was indicted for the crime of genocide for intending to
destroy a substantial or significant part of the Bosnian Muslim people as a national, ethnical, or
religious group.

46

The Tribunal found that Jellisic’s participation in the murder of members of

the protected group of Bosnian Muslims supported of the genocide charge, satisfying the
material element of the crime.

47

However, the prosecution’s charge eventually failed because

the Tribunal also found that the acts of Jellisic were not the physical expression of an affirmed
resolve to destroy in whole or in part a group as such. 48 Jellisic therefore lacked the specific
intent required because he performed his executions randomly. The Tribunal also noted that the
intention necessary for the commission of a crime of genocide may not be presumed even in the
case where the existence of a group is at least in part threatened.

49

Applying the standard set by the ICTY to the case at hand, it is possible that the
prosecution can define the people of the village of Al-Dujayl as a protected group. The
prosecution could argue that the people in the village were singled out by the Defendants and
Saddam Hussein from the rest of the Iraqi community as targets of these attacks and they deserve
44
45

Id.
Id

.
46

Id at 3.

47

Id at 100.

48

Id at 107.

49

Id at 78.
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protection against the crime of genocide. The prosecution could further assert that the villagers
of Al-Dujayl were stigmatized as a cohesive group and viewed themselves as such. Application
of the subjective standard set by Jellisic could successfully classify the villagers as a protected
class but the requisite mens rea could prove difficult for the prosecution to establish. Similar to
the accused in the Jellisic case, the Defendants will state that they did not have the specific intent
to exterminate this group and that this intent cannot be presumed just because the village was
threatened. The defense would further argue that the attack was only retaliatory in nature to
avenge the assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein and does not satisfy the mens rea
requirement for the application of a crime of genocide.
If all the relevant facts are proven, the prosecution can make a showing that the
Defendants committed acts that satisfy a charge of genocide. However, a showing that the
villagers are part of a protected class and that the Defendants specifically intended to destroy this
protected class of people will be difficult for the prosecution to accomplish. According, this will
serve as a bar to a conviction of the crime of genocide.

II.

War Crime

A. Background on War Crimes

13

War crimes can be classified into two categories: 1) war crimes committed in
international armed conflicts and 2) war crimes perpetuated in internal armed conflicts.

50

These

internal conflicts must be large-scale armed hostilities, as opposed to internal disturbances and
tensions, riots or isolated or sporadic acts of armed violence, between State authorities and rebels
or between two or more organized armed groups within a State. 51
War crimes are those violations of the laws of war or international humanitarian law
(herein “IHL”) that incur individual criminal responsibility. 52 The Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907 first codified wartime atrocities and set the standard for these violations.

53

The 1945

Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg defined war crimes as violations of
the laws or customs of war. Such violations include, but are not limited to: murder, ill-treatment
or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity. 54

B. Crimes Against Civilians Under the Geneva Convention as a War Crime

50

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, pg (2003) {Reproduced in the accompanying
Notebook 3 at Tab 37}.
51

Id.

52

Steven Rattner, Categories of War Crimes, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/categories-ofwarcrimes.html {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 63}.
53

The Hague Convention 1899-1954, Laws and Customs of War on Land, available at
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/hague.html {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 11}.
54

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6 (b), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 6}
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Grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are considered war crimes under
international humanitarian law. There are four Geneva Conventions that address grave breaches
as war crimes.

55

Each of the four Geneva Conventions (on wounded and sick on land, wounded

and sick at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians) contains the following list if grave breaches:
willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment (including medical experiments); willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health; extensive destruction and appropriation of
property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; compelling
a prisoner of war or civilian to serve in the forces of the hostile power; willfully depriving a
prisoner of war or protected civilian of the rights of a fair and regular trial; unlawful deportation
or transfer of a protected civilian; unlawful confinement of a protected civilian; and taking of
hostages. 56
The international community has consistently recognized breaches of the Geneva
Convention as punishable war crimes. The Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)
lists as war crimes for international conflicts not only the grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, but also twenty-six serious violations of the laws and customs of war. 57

The

56

Rattner, supra note 52 {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 63}. See Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab
7}

57

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at
http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf {Reproduced in the accompanying
Notebook 1 at Tab 2}. (Article 8 1(b) enumerated the violations as the following: (i) intentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; (ii)
Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives;(iii)
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian
assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled
to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; (iv) Intentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; (v) Attacking or
bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not
military objectives; (vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer
means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the
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Statute of the ICC lists as war crimes for internal conflicts four serious violations of Common
Article 3 (violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, hostage taking, and
summary executions), as well as twelve serious violations of the laws and customs of war (i.e.,
attacks on civilians, pillage, rape, or mutilation).

58

The Statute of the International Criminal

military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury; (viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the
Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer
of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory; (ix) Intentionally directing
attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; (x)
Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person
concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such
person or persons; (xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; (xii)
Declaring that no quarter will be given; (xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; (xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in
a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party; (xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile
party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's
service before the commencement of the war; (xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;(xvii)
Employing poison or poisoned weapons; (xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices; (xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body,
such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions; (xx)
Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed
conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a
comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the
relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123; (xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions; (xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected
person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations; (xxiv) Intentionally
directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law; (xxv) Intentionally using starvation of
civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully
impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions; (xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children
under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
58

Id. at art. 8 2(c). (art. 8 2(e) enumerates violations of the law and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
international character as the following: (i)Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings,
material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in
conformity with international law; (iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units
or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the
international law of armed conflict; (iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded
are collected, provided they are not military objectives; (v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2
(f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3
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Tribunal for Rwanda includes as war crimes serious violations of Common Article 3 as well as
Additional Protocol II. 59 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia includes serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as well
as other rules to protect victims of armed conflict and basic rules on methods of warfare. This
includes violence to life or health (murder, ill-treatment, torture, mutilation, corporal
punishment, rape, enforced prostitution, indecent assault), summary executions, hostage taking,
collective punishment, and pillage.

60

The Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone also

states that the Court has the power to prosecute persons who violate Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II

61

The Iraqi Special Tribunal, similar to the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda
and the Special Court of Sierra Leone has jurisdiction over both grave breaches of the Geneva

common to the four Geneva Conventions; (vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities; (viii) Ordering the displacement of the
civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative
military reasons so demand; (ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary; (x) Declaring that no
quarter will be given;(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical
mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or
hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or
seriously endanger the health of such person or persons; (xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict).
59

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art 4. available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab}
60

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 3, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.html. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 4}.
61

Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone art 3, available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/Statute.html
{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 5}. (Article 3 of this statute states that these violations include
the following: (a) violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective punishments; (c)
taking of hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) pillage; (g) the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples; (h) threats to commit any of the
foregoing acts.)
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Conventions and other crimes committed in these particular conflicts. The ICC also has noted
having have jurisdiction over most war crimes. 62
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention
Grave breaches of the Geneva Convention only apply in an international armed conflict
whereas Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applies to internal armed conflict. In the case at
hand, the conflict between the Defendants and the villagers of Al-Dujayl did not occur in an
international context as all the parties are residents and nationals of Iraq. This signifies that the
events in question must satisfy the non-international internal conflict threshold for Article 3 of
the Geneva Convention to apply.
A war crime is considered a breach of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of
War provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as
a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
2. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording

62

Rattner, supra note 52 {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 63}.
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all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples. 63
International humanitarian law sets standards for parties to an armed conflict on the
treatment of civilians and other protected person. Virtually all Member States have ratified the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, with a majority signing or ratifying the Protocols of 1977. Armed
conflicts, civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure are consequences of
deliberate targeting of non-combatants. 64
C. Application of the Geneva Convention against Defendants
In the case at hand, the actions of the Defendants constitute a war crime in an internal
armed conflict. The modern law of war, now more frequently referred to as the law of armed
conflict or as international humanitarian law, prohibits a range of activities related to the attacks
on civilian persons and objects.

65

Whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the actions of the

Defendants will turn on whether the actions were within the threshold requirement of armed
conflict. There are limits on the right to kill, injure unnecessarily hence making the use of force
and armed conflict inhumane. Flagrant violation of international humanitarian and human rights
law persist when civilians continue to be targets in instances of armed conflict. 66 Article 3, the

63

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm, {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 7}.
64

Id.

65

William J. Fenrick, Justice in Cataclysm Criminal Trials in the Wake of Mass Violence: Comment: Attacking the
Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 539 (1997). {Reproduced in the
accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 42}.

66

Protection of Civilians on Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, U.N. Doc
S/1999/957 (Sept. 08, 1999) {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 14}.
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text of which is repeated in all four Geneva Conventions, is the only part of the conventions that
applies explicitly to internal armed conflicts. 67
Under international law, in order to hold individuals liable for violations of Common
Article 3 and Protocols, the following five requirements must be met: First, the alleged crime(s)
must have been committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict.

Second,

temporal requirements for the applicability of the respective regime must be met. Third,
territorial requirements for the applicability of the respective regime must be met. Fourth, the
individuals charged must be connected to a Party that was bound by the respective regime; and
fifth, the victims of the alleged crimes must have been individuals that were protected under the
respective regime. 68 The issue of a non-international armed conflict will be the controlling
factor for the prosecution of the Iraqi Special Tribunal to establish to prevail in this claim.
D. The Issue of Armed Conflict
The context for the Common Article's application is stated as being an "armed conflict
not of an international character."

69

However, it contains no definition of the term, armed

conflict and does not provide conditions that govern its application. The concept of internal
armed conflict in contemporary international humanitarian law has been, to a considerable
extent, set by International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 70 The ICTY case of
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic fashioned a useful definition of armed conflict to guide other
tribunals.

67

Ratner, Steven, International vs. Internal Armed Conflict, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/intlvs-internal.html {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab}. See Geneva Conventions, art. 2
{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 3 at Tab 64}.
68

Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR ICTR-95-1-I (June 1, 2001)
{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 22}.
69

Geneva Convention, supra note 59, art, 3. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 1 at Tab 7}.
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In the case of the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Tadic, a citizen of the former Yugoslavia,
of Serb ethnic descent, and a resident of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of
the alleged crimes was charged, along with his co-accused, Goran Borovnica, with a total of 132
counts involving grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of
war, and crimes against humanity. 71

The accused were charged with individual counts of

persecution, inhumane treatment, cruel treatment, rape, willful killing, murder, torture, willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health, and inhumane acts. These acts were
alleged to have been committed at the Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje camps and at other
locations in opstina Prijedor in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 72 The indictment
confirmed in 1995 along with the amendments, charges the accused with participation with Serb
forces in the attack, destruction and plunder of Bosnian Muslim and Croat residential areas, the
seizure and imprisonment of Muslims and Croats in the Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje
camps, and the deportation and expulsion by force or threat of force of the majority of Muslim
and Croat residents from opstina Prijedor. The accused are charged with participating in killings,
torture, sexual assaults and other physical and psychological abuse of Muslims and Croats both
within the camps and outside. 73
The Tribunal in The Case of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic stated that an armed conflict
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a

71

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-95-1-AR72 9, Second Amended Indictment, Dec. 14, 1995. {Reproduced in the
accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 23}.
72

Id.

73

Id.
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State.

74

This definition focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the

organization of the parties to the conflict.

75

The Tribunal stated that in an armed conflict of an

internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria are used solely for the purpose, as a
minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived
insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law. 76 In
determining the existence of armed conflict in Prijedor the Tribunal held, in accordance with the
concept outlined above, that "the temporal and geographical scope of both internal and
international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of hostilities." 77 Thus,
international humanitarian law does not pertain only to those areas where actual fighting takes
place; it applies to the entire territory of the state involved in armed conflict. The Tribunal made
the finding that, at all relevant times, an armed conflict was taking place between the parties to
the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of sufficient scope and intensity for the
purposes of the application of the laws or customs of war.

78

The Tribunal in the Tadic case further states that a sufficient nexus must be established
between the alleged offense and the armed conflict which gives rise to the applicability of
international humanitarian law. 79 The Tribunal found that the acts of the accused during the
armed take-over and ethnic cleansing of Muslim and Croat areas of opstina, that the terror
killings or otherwise in the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by
74

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-95-1-AR72 9, Judgment May 7, 1997 {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook
2 at Tab 23}.
75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id.
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Bosnian Serb forces were all directly connected with the armed conflict.80 The finding of the
Tribunal of the existence of armed conflict in relation to the acts of the accused was sufficient to
fulfill the requisite for a war crime.
The precedent on the issue of armed conflict set by the ICTY in the Tadic case has been
following in subsequent ICTY cases as well as other Tribunals. In the ICTY case of the
Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Esad Landzo, the Tribunal
applies the Tadic analysis to find the existence of an internal armed conflict. The Tribunal stated
that Tadic definition of armed conflict was useful to distinguish from cases of civil unrest.

81

In

addition, it asserted that the emphasis in making such a distinction is on “the protracted extent of
the armed violence and the extent of organization of the parties involved.” 82
In that case, ICTY indicted Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo
for forty-nine counts (four of which were removed before trial) with grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and violations of the laws or customs of war. The allegations
stemmed from the events alleged that occurred at a detention facility in the village of Celebici,
located in the Konjic municipality, in central Bosnia and Herzegovina, during certain months of
1992.

83

The Tribunal applies the Tadic test to determine that the presence of combat activities

in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that these forces amount to an armed conflict. 84

80

Id.

81

Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo Case No. IT-96-21, Initial Indictment, March 21,
1996. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 24}.

82

Id.

83

Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, Nov. 16, 1998
{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 24}.
.
84
Id.
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The ICTR, in the Case of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Jean Paul Akayesu adopted
the Tadic formula in determining the existence of an armed conflict in Rwanda. ICTR held that
in order to determine the existence of armed conflict, it is "necessary to evaluate both the
intensity and organization of the parties to the conflict”, in line with the ICTY. 85 The Tribunal
indicted Akayesu for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity for the killing, sexual
abuse and other violence against the Tutsi performed by the accused and the communal police in
Rwanda. 86 Evaluating the intensity and organization of the conflict, the Tribunal determined that
since there was a civil war between two groups, the governmental forces and the RPF, both of
which were well-organized. 87 Further, as pertaining to the intensity of conflict, all observers to
the events stated that the confrontations were forceful. 88

Based on these factors, the Tribunal

found that at the time of the alleged event, an armed conflict not of an international character
existed as covered by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The Special Court of Sierra Leone has made findings similar to those of the ICTY and the
ICTR on the issue of armed conflicts for charges of war crimes. The Special Court of Sierra
Leone indicted Alex Tamba Brima on March 7, 2003 of crimes against humanity, violations of
Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (commonly known
as war crimes) and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, in conformity with
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

85

89

The Court stated that

Akayesu, supra note 32, at 625. {Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 20}.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Alex Tamba Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, available at Trial Watch
http://www.trialch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/legalprocedures/p214.html
{Reproduced in the accompanying Notebook 2 at Tab 25}
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starting on November 30, 1996, a state of armed conflict existed in Sierra Leone and that a link
existed between the armed conflict in question and the acts and omissions considered to
constitute violations of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the SCSL. 90 Brima was the leader of
the AFRC group in its operations to control the district of Kenema and Kono.

91

He was

charged with atrocities against the civilian population such as murder, amputations, abductions,
forced labor, burning down of villages, use of child soldiers, multiple violations of sexual
integrity, forced marriage. The Court stated that their methods were a means to take control of
this territory of Sierra Leone by terrorizing and punishing the civilians in those regions. 92 The
Court found that an armed conflict existed in the hostile nature of these circumstances and also
found him guilty of the above mentioned acts.
In the Defendants case, the prosecution should advocate for the Tribunal to apply the
standard set by the other Tribunals, specifically in the cases of Tadic, Delalic Akeyasu and Brima
in determining the existence of an armed conflict. If the facts are proven, the prosecution can
argue that an armed conflict existed at the relevant time in the village of Al-Dujayl by applying
the law of these cases. Applying the Tadic rule that an armed conflict is an organized conflict,
beyond banditry that can exist before and after the existence of the actual event, the prosecution
can argue that the villagers were subjected to an armed conflict situation not only during the
events that destroyed their village but also for the period of time preceding these events. An
internal armed conflict existed in the village, evidenced by the fact that the Defendants
continuously used armed forces to initially threaten and later attack the villagers. Applying the
rationale of the Delalic case, the prosecution can further prove the existence of an armed conflict
90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

25

by revealing the fact that the Defendants attacked the village in an organizational manner and
that the combat amounted to more than just civil unrest. The prosecution will also find support
in the position of the Akeyasu rule that the intensity and organization of the parties involved
contributes to a showing of armed conflict. The Defendants in this case intensely attacked the
village until they reached their goal of savage destruction of the entire village including its
residents and property. And finally since the Brima case looked to all the circumstances
surrounded the events in question to determine an armed conflict, the prosecution can likewise
use this to their favor. The Defendants attacked all the villagers of Al-Dujayl including young
women and children, making the attack hostile and brutal. The Defendants used all possible
means to further their goal of taking the village of Al-Dujayl away from the villagers. Based on
the foregoing reason, the prosecution will be able to establish the existence of an armed conflict
in the village of Al-Dujayl
E. The Issue of Large-Scale Hostility
A war crime must be an internal conflict that is a large-scale armed hostility, as opposed to
internal disturbances and tensions, riots or isolated or sporadic acts of armed violence, between
State authorities and rebels or between two or more organized armed groups within a State.93
Once the prosecution establishes that an armed conflict existed in the village of Al-Dujayl, it
must then prove that Defendants conduct amounts to a large-scale attack. If the facts stated
above are proven, it is evident that the attack on the village of Al-Dujayl was not an isolated
incident.

The Defendants working in conjunction delegated tasks in a manner that would

eliminate the entire village. They detained, executed and deported the villagers over the course of
several years. The Defendants were organized and meticulous in their conduct. As further
evidenced by the fact that the entire village has been destroyed, the prosecution can successfully
93
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argue that these armed attacks were large-scale in nature, proving that the Defendants committed
a war crime.
III.

Crime Against Humanity

A. Definition
Crimes against humanity, defined by Article 12 of the Statute of the Iraqi Tribunal
allow for prosecution for crimes that are part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population with knowledge of the attack. 94
B. Background on Crimes Against Humanity
The offense known as a crime against humanity dates back to 1945 when the United States
and other Allies developed the Agreement for the prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), sitting
at Nuremberg.

95

Article 6 (c) of this Charter defines Crimes against Humanity as “atrocities

and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic
laws of the country where perpetrated.” 96 This was the first time that a crime against humanity
was recognized as a positive international law.
Since its inception, crimes against humanity has been included in the statutes of the
International

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),The Special Court for Sierra Leone as well as in the
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statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). These crimes refer to specific acts of violence
against persons irrespective of whether the person is a national or nonnational and irrespective of
whether these acts are committed in time of war or time of peace, and (2) these acts must be the
product of persecution against an identifiable group of persons irrespective of the make-up of
that group or the purpose of the persecution. 97 This is often stated as a "widespread or
systematic" conduct of the perpetrators which results in the commission of the specific crimes
contained in the definition of crimes against humanity.
C. A Crime Against Humanity Under The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Crime
The Iraqi Special Tribunal codifies Crimes Against Humanity in Article 12 of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal. The Article states:
A crime against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack:
1. Murder;
2. Extermination;
3. Enslavement;
4. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
5. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental norms of international law;
6. Torture;
7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
9. Enforced disappearance of persons; and
10. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 98
D. The Mens Reas Requirement
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In the case The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held
that:
the determination of the elements comprising the mens rea of crimes against humanity
has proved particularly difficult and controversial. Nevertheless, the requisite mens rea
for crimes against humanity appears to be the intent to commit the underlying offence,
combined with the knowledge of the broader context in which that offence occurs. 99
In the case Ruzindana, the Tribunal for Rwanda stated that:
The perpetrator must knowingly commit crimes against humanity in the sense that he
must understand the overall context of his act. Therefore, an accused should be aware of
this greater dimension in order to be culpable thereof. Accordingly, actual or constructive
knowledge of the broader context of the attack, meaning that the accused must know that
his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population and
pursuant to some kind of policy or plan, is necessary to satisfy the requisite mens rea
element of the accused." 100
Crimes against humanity require the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. 101 The crimes need
not be both widespread and systematic but one is a requisite for this crime.

102

“Widespread” is

defined as massive or large-scale, involving many victims; “systematic” refers to an organized
pattern of conduct, not a mere random occurrence.

103

E. Application of Crimes Against Humanity
In the case at hand, the prosecution has a viable case for a crime against humanity against
the Defendants. The facts reveal that the Defendants deported residents of the village of AlDujayl to Iran imprisoned them until as late as 1986 and summarily murdered hundreds of
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people of the village of Al-Dujayl. The Defendants also allegedly took part in other inhumane
acts such as cutting down all of the date trees in the village, bull-dozing the entire town and
destroying over 247,000 acres of orchards and palm groves. 104 If these facts are proven at the
trial, then the conduct of the Defendant would fall within the definition of a crime against
humanity as a violation of Article 5 of the International Statute. In order for the Iraqi Special
Tribunal to convict the Defendants of a crime against humanity, the prosecution will have to
prove the requisite elements of the crime as detailed below.
The prosecution will have to prove that the Defendants possessed the requisite mens rea
component for this crime. In the case of Niyitegeka, the ICTR found that the Niyitegeka
participated in and led the attacks against Tutsi including the shooting of Tutsi refugees and
procurement of weapons and gendarmes for attacks against Tutsi. 105 The Tribunal stated that
these revealed that found that Niyitegeka had the requisite intent to kill them. 106 Their actions in
planning and carrying out the attacks indicted that it was a widespread and systematic attack
against the civilian Tutsi population. 107
This case is analogous to the Defendants’ treatment of the villagers of Al-Dujayl. If the
prosecution is able to prove the facts stated above, this would show that the compounded acts of
the Defendants in killing, detaining, deporting the villagers and destroying the village indicates
that the Defendants understood the consequences of their actions. They were aware that their
actions would create devastation for the people of Al-Dujayl. The prosecution may be able to
show that the Defendants intended to retaliate against the village for their assassination attempt
104
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against Saddam Hussein. This would further show that it was their intent to cause suffering upon
the village to create an example for any other rebel forces in Iraq that may chose to harm
Hussein. The prosecution must make a showing that the Defendants had knowledge that their
conduct would create devastation.
F. Widespread and Systematic
The prosecution will also have show that along with the requisite mens rea, the
Defendants behaved in a widespread and systematic fashion in accordance with a plan to carry
out the alleged attacks. In the case of the Prosecutor v. Eliebezer Niyitegeka, there was evidence
of daily attacks in Bisesero against the Tutsi seeking shelter there, leading to thousands of Tutsi
being killed, and that of a large number of Tutsi refugee corpses in Kibuye town at the relevant
time.

108

killing.

The evidence further showed that all ages and sexes of Tutsis were targeted in the

109

The attacks were considered to be methodical, organized and on a large scale,

involving many armed attackers.

110

Therefore, the Tribunal found that the attacks against the

Tutsi civilian population were widespread and systematic attack. 111
In the case at hand, the alleged attacks by the Defendants upon the village of Al-Dujayl
were widespread and systematic in that the Defendants intended to cause suffering to the
people of Al Dujayl by all possible means. They killed them, deported them, destroyed their
homes and orchards. Implementing a systematic mechanism to inflict harm, they even removed
all the date trees in the village that serves as a viable resource for the villagers. The Defendants
did not discriminate in their conduct, killing men, women and children, essentially anyone that
108
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was present in the village at the time of the attack. The Defendants were organized in their plan
of destruction to the extent that they even destroyed the agriculture of the village before they
bulldozed the entire town. The IST should be able to make finding of a widespread and
systematic attack analogous to the case of Niyitekga.
PART TWO
IV.

CRIMINAL DEFENSES OF THE DEFENDANTS

A. Justified Self Defense
The Defendants may claim self defense or justified reprisal in their defense. They may
assert that the people of Al Dujayl attacked Saddam Hussein’s convoy, provoking the retaliatory
attacks on the village.

Self-defense is lawful provided that the acts fulfill the following

requirements:
1. the actions in self-defense are done in response to an imminent or actual lawful attack of
the person or another person
2. there is no other way of preventing or stopping the offenses
3. the unlawful conduct of the other has not been caused by the person acting in self-defense
4. the conduct in self-defense is proportionate to the offense to which the person reacts. 112
It is questionable whether these Defendants can invoke this defense because while the
violent acts may be retaliatory in nature, they did not immediately react to the attack against
Saddam Hussein’s convoy and instead waited a period of time to launch their retaliatory action.
They did not do so at the time of the conflict but instead waited to bring in reinforcements. Their
attack on the village was not necessarily a measure to prevent any further harm because they did
not take specific steps to combat future assassination attempts and instead chose to destroy an
entire village consisting of thousands of people.
Moreover, justified self-defense requires proportionality between the harm prevented and
the harm inflicted, in the sense that the prevention of harm cannot be achieved by causing harm
112
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that is completely disproportionate.113 The principle of proportionality is embedded in almost
every national legal system and underlies the international legal order.
proportionality is the basis of The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1947.

114

115

The issue of
The Additional

Protocol I of 1977 extended the requirement of proportionality to non-combatants by defining
war crimes to include the military destruction of a non-military target. 116 Justified self-defense
requires proportionality between the harm prevented and the harm inflicted, in the sense that the
prevention of harm cannot be achieved by causing harm that is completely disproportionate. 117
If the alleged acts committed against the village of Al-Dujayl are attributed to the
Defendants and the Tribunal finds that the Defendants acted in retaliation, then their conduct
would be considered disproportionate to the assassination attempt. The prosecution can argue the
requisite proportionality is lacking since the offense in question was a failed assassination
attempt while the conduct in self-defense was the massacre of an entire village. The Defendants
also murdered all its’ inhabitants. Some have argued extending this defense to include cases
where an attack has already occurred has not yet occurred but a party is preparation to attack. 118
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This argument has been widely criticized. 119 This argument does not apply to the case at hand
because there is no evidence that indicates that the villagers were planning a future attack against
Saddam Hussein. It’s unclear that the Defendants prevented any future harm.
The United States has also attempted to invoke this defense as a justification of the
United States invasion of Iraq. In March 2003, the United States declared war against Iraq.

120

The United States justified the war based on Iraq's suspected development of nuclear and
biological weapons and its suspected involvement with terrorist organizations.

121

Based on this

information, the United States believed that it would be attacked by Iraq or that Iraq would
support another nation in an attack against the United States in the future. The United States' war
against Iraq, therefore, was based on the doctrine of self-defense, more specifically anticipatory
self-defense.
The United States’ use of this defense is questionable. International customary law requires
a country's act of anticipatory self-defense to contain the elements of necessity, immediacy, and
proportionality.

122

The President attempted to present the threats from Iraq as imminent and

necessary. President Bush first began applying the right of anticipatory self-defense to Iraq
when he stated in his State of the Union Address that Iraq was one of the countries that made up
the "axis of evil.” 123 He stated that, "Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to
support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, nerve gas, and nuclear weapons
119
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for over a decade." 124 He also intimated that the United States would act unilaterally by stating,
"I will not wait on events while danger gathers. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and
closer.”

125

While the United States attempted to convince the nation and the international

community that Iraq posed an imminent threat that justified the invasion, the evidence that Iraq
had nuclear and biological weapons has been seriously questioned.

126

Hans Blix, the Chief on

the U.N. inspectors, stated in a briefing to the Security Council that they had not located any
evidence that would suggest that Iraq has been producing nuclear and biological weapons prior
to the invasion.

127

The facts support the conclusion that the United States acted unilaterally and

their invasion of Iraq does not qualify an anticipatory self-defense.
The United States was unsuccessful in invoking a self-defense justification for the war on
Iraq because the situation lacked the requisite immediacy which then negated the existence of
necessity and created disproportionality. Without evidence of real threat from Iraq, the United
State’s defense failed. This is analogous to the case of the Defendants before the Iraqi Special
Tribunal. There is no evidence indicating that the villagers were plotting against Saddam
Hussein, creating a threat that would necessitate destroying the entire village. The assassination
attempt may have been the result of the intentions of a few villagers and not the entire village.
Even if there was an imminent threat to Hussein’s life, the Defendants did not tailor conduct
accordingly. They instead chose to wipe out the entire village, indicating that their behavior was
not the result of self-defense.
B. Use of Force
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It can be argued that the Defendants exercised unnecessary force in the treatment of the
people of Al Dujayl which would further diminish any self defense claim. States are forbidden
to use, or threaten to use, force in their relations. 128 The use of force against civilians is only
permitted when there is no other alternative to inflicting injury and suffering for achieving a
lawful military objective. 129 The Defendants may assert that their treatment of the people of Al
Dujayl was retaliatory in nature and necessary to punish them for their attack against his convoy.
But they are still culpable for the excessive and unnecessary use of force. The violent killing of
500 residents compounded with the fact that he bulldozed the town, destroyed the orchard and
deported 186 people indicates that his use of force was excessive. The method and means that
they employed did not inflict the least possible amount of suffering and injury.
C. Reprisals
Reprisal is a legal term in international humanitarian law describing a particular kind of
retaliation. 130 Rules of customary law have developed in the past that provide the limits within
which retaliation could be regarded as a legitimate reprisal.

131

Lawful reprisal consists of acts

which normally would be illegal, but are taken in response to prior illegal attacks. A reprisal can
only be taken as a last resort in self-defense, and must be executed with the objective of ensuring
future compliance with legal norms. 132
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The main elements of this customary "right of reprisal" are: subsidiarity (failure of all
other available means), notice (formal warning of the planned action), proportionality (the
damage and suffering inflicted on the adverse party not to exceed the level of damage and
suffering resulting from its unlawful conduct), temporary character (termination of the reprisal
when the adversary stops violating the law).

133

All four Geneva Conventions of 1949

categorically prohibit reprisals against the persons and objects they are designed to protect.

134

In the case at hand, the Defendants did not conduct reprisals with the intent of ensuring
that the villagers conduct themselves properly. The Defendants incapacitated the entire village,
making it clear that their aim did not involve any form of rehabilitation. They made no attempts
to find the specific individuals who initially attacked Hussein’s convoy. The damage that they
inflicted upon the village far exceeded the unlawful conduct of the villagers. Additionally, the
Defendants did not provide the villagers with an opportunity to cease their unlawful conduct in
the future and instead chose to murder all of them. For the above reasons, the prosecution can
successfully argue that the Defendants actions were not the result of a lawful reprisal.
D. Justifiable Necessity
Justified necessity derives from the utilitarian consideration of the lesser evil involved. 135
Its scope is limited by the underlying duty of social solidarity. 136 In a situation of necessity, a
utilitarian approach weighs all of the interests and considerations that may influence the balance
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between the harm inflicted and the harm prevented. 137 The balance is one of competing interests
rather than simply one of competing values, and the theory is that of balancing interests. The
term "interest" is quite broad. The following considerations must be weighed in striking the
balance between the harm inflicted and the harm prevented:
(1) the societal importance of the protected values (life versus freedom or property,
physical integrity versus freedom or property, freedom versus property, etc.) as a central
consideration in striking the balance;
(2) the concrete worth of protected interests (a work of art of acknowledged artistic or
historic value as opposed to a work lacking recognized value, the value of a multi-storied
residence or hotel as opposed to a private home or an individual apartment);
(3) the severity of the threat to the protected interest (concrete or abstract);
(4) the probability of the realization of the threat to the protected interest, and the
probability of harm to another protected interest;
(5) the probability of saving the protected interest
(6) the autonomy of the person who possesses the threatened interest (for example, the
owner may not desire that the interest be defended);
(7) the source of the threat; and
(8) the consistence of protecting the interest of the legal order (the case of escape from
legal custody). 138
The harm prevented must therefore significantly outweigh the harm inflicted.
In the case at hand, the Defendants will claim that they were acting to protect their
superior, Saddam Hussein from the villagers of Al-Dujayl that garnered hostility and disdain for
Hussein. They may argue that they were attempting to protect him and themselves against the
threatening villagers. They may assert that they were preventing any further harm. While it is
unclear whether any harm was actually prevented, the Defendants claim will nevertheless fail
when the balancing test stated above is applies. While the Defendants may have been protecting
certain important societal values such as respect to authority and civil peace, the severity of their
threat and the source of the threat are to sever to create an adequate balance for the doctrine of
justifiable necessity. As previously states, the Defendants used all possible means to forcibly
137
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punish the villagers on Al-Dujayl in a brutal and appalling fashion. The nexus between the harm
prevented and the harm inflicted is nonexistent.
Under international law, a state is excused from a legal infringement if its acts to
“safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril”.

139

As in domestic penal

law, this principle is called necessity. It is defined in the Article 25 of the Articles of the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the UN International Law
Commission.

140

Article 25 views necessity as an extraordinary plea and imposes severe

limitations on its invocation.

141

The act done must be the only way to prevent peril. What is

more, action taken under “necessity” may not seriously impair an essential interest. 142 Necessity
according to Article 25 may not be invoked if the state by its own action contributed to creating
the situation of peril.

143

The standard of contribution is low.

144

In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros

Project Case, the International Court of Justice said that the defense of necessity is unavailable
even if the act of the state invoking it is not the cause of the peril. Contributing, in other words,
need not rise to the level of causing. So long as the act was a factor in creating the peril, a plea
of necessity if foreclosed.
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The Defendants’ claim that their conduct was necessitated by the wrongful acts of the
villagers will turn on whether their conduct was necessary as the only means to calm uproar
against Saddam Hussein. The Defendants were not in serious harm; in fact the assassination
attempt was not made directly against them when they carried out the attack on the village.

The

prosecution could argue that the assassination attempt was a result of Hussein’s own conduct.
The prosecution should argue that the Defendants did not face an extraordinary necessity if any
in line with Article 25.

E. Obedience to the Orders of a Superior
The Defendants may also claim a defense in that they allegedly followed the orders of
their superior, Saddam Hussein in carrying out these attacks and therefore, are not liable for their
actions. The Nuremberg Tribunal first discussed this defense. Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter
deals specifically with the defense of superior orders. While obedience to superior orders is not
always a defense, that issue may be considered after a finding of culpability when considering
the imposition of sanction. 146 Many international criminal tribunals have taken a similar stance
by imposing liability on defendants. These courts prohibit a defense of superior orders per se, but
typically allow the fact that a subordinate followed a superior's order to serve as a mitigating
factor for sentencing purposes. Treating the fact that a subordinate followed an order only as a
mitigating factor for sentencing purposes allows the subordinate to avoid some punishment but it
does not absolve him of responsibility. 147
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During the trial of twenty-two defendants held at the Nuremberg Tribunal, it was the
primary contention of the various defendants that they were entitled to rely upon the defense of
superior orders, particularly where the individual defendants lacked the specific knowledge that
the order in question was illegal.

The Tribunal nevertheless refused to accept this defense,

particularly in the Case of General Keitel. The Tribunal also refused to view the defense for
mitigation of punishment. The Tribunal stated that where "crimes so shocking and extensive had
been committed consciously, ruthlessly and without military excuse or justification"; the defense
was unavailable for any purposes. 148
The applicability of this defense for the Defendants will turn on whether the prosecution
will be able to make a showing that the alleged crimes were shocking, extensive, conscious,
ruthless and without military justification. The analysis of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the
General Keitel case will provide useful for the IST in determining how much weight to give this
defense. Similar to Nuremberg Trials, the case at hand contains allegations of war crimes and
crimes against humanity.

The Defendants in the case before the Iraqi Special Tribunal

essentially destroyed an entire village in Iraq. The destruction included all the inhabitants of the
village and all the property and land in the village. If the facts are proved as alleged, this should
be sufficient to make a showing that this was a shocking and ruthless crime. A military
justification is lacking because the Defendants did not target only the people who attempted to
assassinate Saddam Hussein but instead consciously attacked the village as a whole.
The Defendants may also claim that while they committed these alleged attacks, they
were only following orders and were not in a position to disobey the authority of Saddam
Hussein. They may claim that they feared for their own lives and they were under duress in
deciding whether to carry out these attacks. An early case of the ICTY, Drazen Erdemovic, a
148
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Croat, who initially entered a plea of guilty to the murder of a number of civilians, addressed this
issue.

149

Erdemovic stated that he was told to either participate in the killings, or he could get in

line with the victims. 150 Erdemovic claimed that the threat to be real and that he feared for the
safety of his family if he did not comply with his supervisor’s orders.

151

The Tribunal stated

that the duress that the Erdemovic experienced was not a significant factor in light of the fact that
the order that Erdemovic had received was absolutely illegal and he was duty-bound to refuse to
follow them.

152

The Tribunal, nevertheless eventually sentenced the Erdemovic to 5 years,

indicating that they allowed this defense as a mitigating factor.
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Lieutenant Calley, a lieutenant in the US Army attempted to invoke the defense of
obedience to the orders of a superior before the United States Military Court of Appeals in 1973.
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Lieutenant Calley was found guilty of premeditated murder of 22 people and of one case of

attempted murder against a child of two years of age. 155 On March 16, 1968, The Barker Task
Force of the US Army entered the village of My Lai in Quang Ngai Province situated in South
Vietnam. The Company was under the command of Captain Ernest Medina. In little over three
hours, members of this company executed around 500 civilians including children, women and
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elderly people. 156 Lieutenant Calley was found to have actively participated in the massacre and
execution of the village of My Lai. 157
The Court of Military Appeals stated that Calley could not invoke in the defense of
obedience to the orders of his superiors.

158

The Court stated that indeed, an act committed in

conformity with an illegal order is not subject to punishment, except:
1. if the accused knew that the order was illegal: in such a case the personal character of
the accused must be taken into account (education, hierarchical level, experience in the
field, etc.) or
2. if someone with common sense and understanding, would have known, in the same
circumstances, that this order was illegal: in this case, the assessment is no longer focused
on the personality of the accused but on an abstractly defined standard. 159
In this case, the Court judged that the order given to kill children and unarmed civilians, who
were incapable of offering resistance, was very clearly illegal. Any person “with common sense
and understanding” would have realized this. 160 It was even possible to be more demanding of
Calley in this respect, in view of his grade and experience.
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On 9 November, 1974, William

Calley was paroled and freed after only three and a half years of imprisonment, indicating that
there may have been some leniency towards his sentencing in light of this defense. 162
If Defendants in the Iraqi Special Tribunal claim a defense of obedience to the orders of
their superior, Saddam Hussein similar to cases such Keitel, Erdemovic and Calley, the Iraqi
Special Tribunal should follow the precedents set by cases in the past and find that the
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Defendants had a duty to refuse to commit illegal acts ordered by their supervisor.

The

prosecution can invalidate the extent of this defense by showing that the alleged crimes were
shocking, extensive, had been committed consciously, ruthlessly and without military excuse or
justification similar to prosecution in the Keitel case. The fact that the conduct of the Defendants
wiped out an entire Iraqi village is sufficient to make satisfy this requirement. While the
Defendants may also claim that the feared for the safety of their lives if they disobeyed Hussein’s
orders such as in Erdemovic, the prosecution can highlight the fact that the Defendants knew that
the conduct of these orders were illegal and that they had to duty to present this massacre. The
prosecution should request that the Tribunal invoke the rationale of the Erdemovic case and find
this defense is inapplicable. And finally the prosecution should apply the rule set out by the
Calley case to show that since Defendants knew their acts of murder, detainment and destruction
were illegal and that common sense as well as the law dictates as such, they do not a viable
defense when obedience to superior orders is asserted.

While Tribunals such as the ones

mentioned above has disfavored the defense of obedience to the orders of a superior, they have
nevertheless applied the defense as a consideration in sentencing. Therefore, the IST may
rightfully consider this defense as a justification to mitigate the sentences of the Defendants.
PART THREE
VI. CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
A. Introduction
Although the Iraqi Special Tribunal did not include the Defendants’ superior, Saddam
Hussein in the indictments for the case against the Defendants in connection with their treatment
of the villagers of Al-Dujayl, the IST add his participation in the event to his indictment and be
able to find Hussein culpable for his participation in the attacks. Hussein responded to the
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attempted assassination attempt against him by allegedly ordering the Defendants to conduct the
reprisals against the villagers of Al-Dujayl. While the Defendants may try to claim that they
were following their superior’s orders, a corollary to this doctrine is command responsibility
which will provide a means to find Hussein culpable for the crimes detailed above.
B. Command Responsibility
The Iraqi Special Tribunal’s Statute, Article 15 addresses the issue of individual criminal
responsibility as follows:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 11 to 14 of the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he
knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution. 163
Command responsibility also has a component of constructive knowledge. When the superior
claims that he did not order the alleged crimes and had no knowledge of their commission, the
legal fiction of constructive knowledge is generally implemented. This component is reflected in
the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR. The correct formulation of the doctrine of command
responsibility appears in Article 7 (3) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia
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and in Article 6 (3) of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal

for Rwanda. These articles provide as follows:

The fact that a crime was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or
her superior of criminal liability if he or she knew or had reason to know that
the subordinate was about to commit such acts and had done so and the superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the perpetrators thereof. 165
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Command responsibility has evolved to include both military and non-military personnel.
The development of the law is not based on strict liability, but rather reflects the clear
understanding that every case is to be decided on its own particular set of facts. The concept of
command responsibility is now based on the clear inference that those who occupy the position
of superior, in a superior-subordinate relationship, are, or may be deemed to have:
(a) the knowledge of the criminal actions of the subordinates,
(b) the authority to deal with the criminal actions of the subordinates; and
(c) the power to deal, by with punishment or prevention with the criminal acts of
subordinates. 166
A look at other Tribunal cases is helpful in understanding the doctrine of command
responsibility. The ICTY successfully invoked this doctrine on November 16, 1998 when the
Tribunal entered its judgment in the Case of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Zejnil
Delalic, Zdravko Mucic.
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The Tribunal found the de facto commander of the Celebici prison

camp liable under the principle of command responsibility for various acts of torture and ill
treatment at the camp. 168 It also found two other accused guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and violations of the laws or customs of war for their actions at the camp. 169 A
fourth accused, indicted only under the principle of command responsibility, was found not
guilty on all counts owing to the lack of a superior-subordinate relationship. 170 In making its
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findings on command responsibility, the chamber noted that three elements are required for its
application:
(1) the accused was involved in a superior-subordinate relationship;
(2) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be
committed; and
(3) the superior had failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal act or punish its perpetrator. 171
The Tribunal emphasized that direct command responsibility applies to civilians holding
positions of authority as well as military commanders and that the superior must have "effective
control" over the individuals committing the underlying criminal acts "in the sense of having the
material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these offenses. 172 Applying these
criteria, the Tribunal deemed only Mucic, the camp commander, to have had the authority to
prevent violations of international humanitarian law in the camp. He was found criminally
responsible for having failed to make any serious effort to prevent the violations or to punish his
subordinates for those crimes.

173

The first required element to prosecute a defendant under the doctrine of command
responsibility is a superior-subordinate relationship must exist. The ICTY in the Case of the
Prosecutor v. Furundzija stated that the cumulative effect of evidence showing both subjugation
to orders and respect for the authority of the accused is necessary to convince a tribunal of
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship.
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The Tribunal found that the commander

of the local Croatian Defense Council was called the boss by members of his camp but while
this implied that he was in charge and they respected him, it was not alone sufficient to infer
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subordination. 175 The Tribunal states that it required evidence of subjugation through the overall
behavior by camp personal and the commander’s duties. 176
Turning to the issue of actual knowledge, the term denotes awareness as to the existence
of a circumstance or awareness of it occurring.

177

In the absence of direct evidence,

constructive knowledge may be established through circumstantial evidence. 178 To determine
whether or not a commander must have known about the acts of his subordinates, the following
factors are to be considered:
1) The number of illegal acts;
2) The type of illegal acts;
3) The scope of illegal acts;
4) The time during which the illegal acts occurred;
5) The number and type of troops involved;
6) The logistics involved, if any;
7) The geographical location of the acts;
8) The widespread occurrence of the acts;
9) The tactical tempo of operations;
10) The modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
11) The officers and staff involved; and
12) The location of the commander at the time. 179
In the Far East Military Tribunal case of Tomoyuki Yamashita, General Yamashita
attempted to escape culpability by claiming that he had in no way ordered, authorized or had
knowledge of the attacks. 180 The charges stemmed from the killing of twenty-five thousand
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innocent civilians. The allegations stated that Yamashita had committed a substantial number of
war crimes and commanded his troops to demolish homes, churches, and towns without military
necessity. 181 Yamishita claimed that he had lost contact with his troops, that his subordinates had
disregarded his orders to abandon the attacks, and acted individually. Nevertheless, the Tribunal
found that alleged acts were so widespread that General Yamashita must have knowledge of
them, and that if he did not, that this lack of knowledge was deliberate in that he must have taken
some positive step to avoid acquiring knowledge.

182

The Tribunal stated that he must have

condoned the crimes and had known and ordered the crimes because the crimes were so
pervasive. The Tribunal also found him liable for failing to punish the perpetrators of the acts
that were committed under this command.
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In the Case of the Special Court of Sierra Leone v. Santigie Borbor Kanu, the Tribunal
accused Kanu of crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law, in conformity with Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the SCSL. 184 Kanu
was alleged to have been Commander of the AFRC/RUF forces in the district of Kono in the east
of Sierra Leone which led attacks against the civilian population in the regions of Kailahun,
Kono, Koinagugu and Bombali between February and December of 1998. 185 Kanu was also
alleged to have to have been one of the three Commanders who led the attack against Freetown
and who directed all ground operations against the civilian population of Freetown as well as
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against the civilian population living in the region surrounding the capital. 186 All of these acts
amounted to summary executions, mutilations, looting and burning of villages, violations of
sexual integrity, forced marriages, abductions and forced labor, particularly in the diamond
mines, and the enlistment and use of child soldiers. 187
Kanu is alleged to be criminally responsible for the above mentioned crimes, whether it
be for his personal contribution to their planning, instigating, and organizing in which he would
have participated in one way or another, or alternatively where they are alleged to have been
committed as part of a common criminal conspiracy in which he participated. 188 The indictment
holds him to have equal or additional responsibility in his role as hierarchical superior, for crimes
committed by his subordinates, for which he had, or should have had knowledge and also
because he did not take the necessary measures aimed at the prevention or punishment of such
crimes. 189 On 27 January 2004 the SCSL ordered the joint trial of Santigie Borbor Kanu, Alex
Tamba Brima and Brima Bazzy Kamara. The trial is scheduled to begin during the first few
months of 2005. 190 The indictments make clear that the defense of command responsibility will
be disfavored for the Defendants.

191

The SCSL will apply precedents set by the ICTY and

ICTR.
C. Application of Command Responsibility
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Saddam Hussein may advance the defense that his subordinates carried out the attacks on
the village of Al-Dujayl, relieving him of culpability for the offense. The first issue that the
prosecution must address is whether he ordered the specific attacks in retaliation of the
assassination attempt against him. If the prosecution can prove that Hussein ordered the attacks,
then the IST could convict him for the crime because he would then be criminally responsible for
those crimes. Hussein would then not be able to shield himself from responsibility by claiming
that he in fact did not commit any of the alleged atrocities.
Saddam Hussein may also claim that he in fact did not order the attacks against the
village and that he did not have knowledge of the attacks. In that case, the prosecution will have
to show that Hussein had constructive knowledge of the criminal acts of his subordinates.
Under the 1998 statute of the new International Criminal Court, a military commander is liable
for crimes that he "knew or should have known" about under circumstances at the time, and only
for those crimes committed by forces under his "effective command and control." He is liable if
he "failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures" to prevent and repress such crimes that
subordinates "were committing or about to commit" or for failing to report such crimes to proper
authorities. 192 Based on this standard, if the IST makes a finding that Hussein did not have
actual knowledge of the attacks, the prosecution can still counter this defense and find him liable.
The prosecution should claim that he should have known about the attacks that were occurring in
the village, should have taken reasonable measures to prevent the alleged violence and failed to
reprimand his subordinates for carrying out these brutal crimes against the people of Al-Dujayl.
Hussein’s possible claim that he lacked the requisite knowledge of the alleged crimes
would fail under the precedent of Yamashita.

The landmark case of General Yamishita

addressing command responsibility is directly on point with the case of Saddam Hussein before
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the IST. Hussein may claim that he did not order, authorize or have knowledge of the attacks
against the people of Al-Dujayl similar to General Yamishita’s claim that he had no knowledge
of the killing of twenty-five thousand civilians. 193 Hussein’s defense of lack of knowledge will
fail based on the precedent set out by the Far East Tribunal. The alleged attacks on the village of
Al-Dujayl were widespread in nature in that the entire village disappeared over a period of time.
Hussein will be unable to claim that he was unaware of these occurrences. The prosecution can
also set forth the argument that Hussein failed to prevent any of the atrocities or punish his
subordinates as in Kanu. Once the IST finds that Hussein had actual or constructive knowledge
of the Defendants’ actions, it can find him culpable for failing to punish his subordinates for
allegedly destroying the village of Al-Dujayl.
VII.

CONCLUSION

When the Defendants are brought before the Iraqi Special Tribunal for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide in connection with their treatment of the villagers of Al-Dujayl
and the facts alleged are proved by the prosecution, there is a viable claim for war crimes and
crimes against humanity. The charge of alleged genocide will fail because the Defendants did
not target a national, ethic, racial or religious group as required by Article II of the 1948 United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. International
Humanitarian Law does not support a finding of genocide in the case at hand because the
villagers do not qualify as a protected class of people.
The Defendants can be held culpable for war crimes in violation of Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. The Defendants implemented a large-scale hostile attack against the villagers of
Al-Dujayl where they murdered, deported and detained them, and finally destroying all of their
land. They did so during a period of an internal armed conflict. The conduct of the Defendants
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satisfies the standards set by the international community for culpability for a war crime.
Additionally, the Defendants’ actions were conducted in a widespread and systematic method
with the intent to inflict harm upon the village giving rise to a viable charge of a crime against
humanity. A viable defense that the Defendants may attempt to raise is doctrine of obedience to
superior orders. This may serve as successful means to reduce their sentence.
Additionally, if the Iraqi Special Tribunal chooses to add the charges brought against the
Defendants to the indictment against Saddam Hussein, Hussein may be held criminally culpable
for the mistreatment and murder of the villagers of Al-Dujayl. The prosecution would have to
prove the Hussein had a position of superiority over the Defendants, that he ordered the attacks
or had knowledge, actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct of the Defendants and that he
failed to take any measures to prevent the attack.

This would then allow the successful

application of the doctrine of command responsible to find Saddam Hussein criminally culpable.
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